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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HUBERT \\TOLFE, SHIR.LEY WOLFE, 
his wife, ELLIOTT ''""OLFE, KA YL.A 
\V.OLFE and ~lERRILL STRONG, co-
partner8, doing business under the fir1n 
nan1e and st~~le of WOLFE'S DEPART-
)lENT STORE, and WOLFE'S DE-
p ART:JIEXT STO·RE, a co-partnership, 
Plaintiffs .and Respondents 
vs. 
~ ... \R.A.H \\~RITE and JAMES L. WHITE, 
her husband, 
Defendants and AppelZants. 




The ·principal question presented in this case is 
whether an unqualified agreement between landlord and 
tenant that the latter, for a recited valuable considera-
tion accepts the premises, including an old building, 
''in the condition and state of repair they are now in,'' 
is a valid covenant, enforceable between the contracting 
parties; and whether a covenant to keep such condition 
i1nposes a duty to change it. 
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2 
HISTORY OF LITIGATION 
A brief history of this case will be of assistance in 
showing how the points here presented arise. 
The case was filed by respondents on a complaint 
(1), which, as then filed, alleged a basis for claim, (a) 
the lease between the parties, (b) defective construction 
or insufficiency of the roof drain, and (c) that the roof 
supports were inadequate, both as to ''design and con-
struction.'' It alleged the duty of appellants to put both 
in good condition, and our delict of such duty. 
A demurrer (22) and a motion to strike (24) were 
filed. The former raised the effect of the acceptance of 
conditions complained of by the covenant of respondents, 
and that no chU~nge in the roof had be;en alleged; and the 
motion to strike, challenged a number of allegations, :par-
ticularly including the reference to the requirements of 
Salt Lake City. It raised the grounds that the ordinance 
pleaded and the expressions of opinion showed no ~e­
quirement by public officials, and that, as between the 
parties, the assertions by City authorities had no bearing 
or materiality, and imposed no legal duty on us. 
After these were argued, respondents filed a bill of 
particulars (30). This is largely argument. It was ap-
parently treated as an addition to the complaint, but 
has been ignored. 
Thereafter, and to meet the ground raised by the 
general demurrer, respondents filed an amendment to 
the complaint (36). This alleged a number of substantial 
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3 
changt)~ in the condition of the roof structure, after the 
building had been accepted in the condition it was in, 
and before respondent~ went into possession on June 
6, 1946. -4\~ stated by this Court, in its opinion ton first 
appeal ( 197 P. 2d 125, at 130), '·the ·plaintiffs do not, 
at any point in their co1nplaint, indicate that the roof 
'va~ not in ·good condition and repair' on that day." 
The opinion then points !out that the letter of the City 
Bureau of Inspection to respondents, p-leaded (18), 
pointed out ''what the · defects are, and indicates also 
that the roof drainage system had pToved ina:dequa te. '' 
. .A.lso, H that at no time in either of the letters is there 
any determination as to when the eondition first de-
veloped, or as to how long it has existed." 
The opinion then (at p. 131) points out, at some 
length, the allegations of this amendment to the com-
plaint as to changes in the condition of the building, 
after it was accepted by respondents. We quote as fol-
lows (p. 131): 
''The plaintiffs by their a1nended con1plaint 
allege that: 
" '* * * after the lease was entered into 
the roof commenced to sag * * * which sagging 
gradually became worse. * * * that in January 
1946 the plaintiffs first learned that the roof 
was actually dangerous .and unsafe * * * that 
the said roof was unsafe and was not in good 
condition a.nd repa.ir .a.t that time in January 1946) 
(not date of lease) a.nd beca;ne p.rogressi,oely 
worse so that when plaintiffs were to take phy-
sical possession of the property the roof ha,d 
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become so unsafe as to be dangerous to life and 
limb * * * that the sagging of the roof became 
p~rogressiv~ely W'O·rse and the roof was dangerous 
and unsafe because of the matters and things 
heretofore set forth and because of the * * * 
(Here the complaint sets out the exact defects), 
* * * and on 10T about June 7, 1946 by reason of 
said conditions the roof had become ·dangerous 
and unsafe * * * that plaintiffs do not kno'v when 
the said roof first becarne dangerous and unsafe 
but the said unsafe condition beran~e progJ~essive­
ly worse frorn the d~ate of sa.id lease * * *' (Italics 
added.) 
''The pleadings obviously refer t~o condition~ 
after the execution of the lease." 
Obviously, this Court attached great importance to 
these allegations of changes in conditions of the building. 
The reference in the opinion to the conditions point-
ed out by the City Inspector on April 29, 1946, is to a 
letter of that date (18), which states "that the trusses 
were not adequate both as to desi_gn and as to erection. 
Also, that the main ceiling beams both for the front and 
rear part of the store are sagged and are evidently too 
light to carry the roof load. Also that the roof drainage 
system has proved to be inadequate.'' 
These encompassed all of the conditions objected to. 
This letter also points out, after stating the opinion of 
the authorities, the full measure of any action taken or 
indicated by them. It said: "These factors make it man-
datory upon me to refuse to allow continued occupancy 
of this structure beyond this summer season for fear of 
future heavy snow loading which might cause total heam 
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and trn~s failure and eonsequent collapse of the roof 
structure.'' 
These 'opinions of the City authorities, while they 
"-ere used throug·hout the trial to greatly influence the 
jury, were finally re1noved fron1 the case, as a basis of 
duty or liability, by an instruction of the court (149), 
and are no longer of importance as constituting any 
basis of right or duty. 
This instruction \Yas that the responsibility of the 
defendants was not to be determined ''by any act or 
finding of the building inspector . . . the defendants' 
only obligation 'vas, as provided in the lease, to keep 
the roof of said building in good condition and repair.'' 
'Vhile the jury were also told, in different ways, by the 
Court repeatedly that "keep," as used, meant "put" in 
good condition, this instruction eliminated any issue 
as to ''official requiren1ents.'' It is the law of the case. 
After this amendment, the demurrer was renewed 
as to the comp~laint, as amended ( 43), and a new motion 
to strike ( 44) was filed. The demurrer raised the same 
matters. The motions to strike were directed to three 
alleged matters: (1) the intimated official requirements 
(2) the alleged oral statements made prior to the exe-
cution of the lease, and (3) the alleged changes in con-
dition, after its execution. As stated, ( 1) is now out. 
No evidence was offered on (2). And, the motion as 
to ( 3), on the grounds urged both in the Court below 
and here, are not now vital, for the reasons referred to 
belo,v, in the argument. 
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There was also, incidentally, a motion to strike the 
allegation that defendant James White drew the lease. 
Since there is no ambiguity in the lease, no rule of con-
structi1on as to this is involved. This record shows, inci-
dentally, that Mr. Wolfe was well able to take care 
of himself. 
Thereafter, this general demurrer was again sus-
tained, and the special den1urrers and motions to strike 
were overruled (49). The respondents stood on these 
pleadings, and the first appeal was taken (60). 
On appeal, as ~ited above, the opinion of this Court 
reversed the Trial Court, ap·parently by reason of the al-
legations of changes in the conditions after the lease, as 
above quoted, from page 131 of this Court's opinion, and 
influenced perhaps by reason of the fact that it was then 
assumed that the alleged ''acts or ·findings'' of the 
City Inspector constituted ''requirements of public 
authorities,'' as discussed at pages 130 and 131 of the 
. . 
OplnlOD. 
On trial of the ca.se, as indicated by instructions 
which will be hereinafter referred to, the trial went upon 
the general theory that our liability had been settled 
by this Court, and that the matter for trial was the 
amount of damage we should pay. 
We proceeded with the trial, expecting that s1ome 
evidence of change in structure would be introduced, pur-
suant to the amendment to the complaint. This amend-
Inent was used, however, merely for the purpose of 
getting past the demurrer and app·eal. No evidence was 
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introdncPd of anY chano·e after the lease was sie:ned ~ b ' ~ 
and before the building- \Ya:s torn out. 
\Y. e, on the ~other hand, introduced some evidence, 
and the evidence generally showed, without contradiction, 
that there had been no change. The Trial Court took the 
position that he understood the decision of this Court 
"~as to the effect that the covenant to ''keep'' the roof 
in good repair meant that we were to "put" it in such 
repair, both as to the drainage system and roof sup·port, 
and the case was :so ruled. (See instructions, 144-147, 
153-154, and, also, the form of verdict, 1615). 
Our requests for special interrogatories nn the point 
a~ to whether there had been any change, was denied 
( 116). ..A.s were, also, our motions ( 972) and our requests 
for a directed verdict (118), and our other requests to 
subn1it the question of change, if any, to the jury (See 
119, 121, 123). 
STATEMENT OF FAC'TS 
The facts material to: an understanding of the ques-
tions raised on appeal will be stated as concisely as 
possible. These are, for the most part, not in dispute. 
Some matters which were in dispute, were within the 
province of the jury to determine, and are not material 
here. 
The building involved here, except the rear or west 
wall, and the baJeony joined thereto, was constructed 
about 1902 (689). In 1922, it was rernodeled under the 
supervision of Miles Miller, architect ( 689). ·So that 
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the building, a.t the time t~is lease was entered into, was 
about 43 y~ars old, and, at the time of the expiration of 
the lease, would be 63 years old. The defendant Mrs. 
White acquired it about January 1, 1943. 
The remodeling in 1922 and 1923 was by the Hal-
loran Judge Trust Company, and was for the purpose 
of occupancy by the J. C. Penney Store, which occupied 
it until about 1936 (781). A new roof thereon was in-
stalled in May of 1937, after Penney's moved out, by 
the Layton Ro1ofing Company of Salt Lake City (781), 
prep:a.ratory to which some of the sheathing had been 
taken off, and the underneath roof -structure examined 
( 782), and tests made as to the vibration and strength of 
the understructure ( 783). 
At that time, or thereafter, it was leased to Stewart 
Novelty Company, which, by the terms of the lease, 
occupied it until about June 6, 1946 (802). 
The lease here involved was executed February 
19, 1945, to commence March 7, 1945, and, under which, 
re-sp9ndents were to take possession June 6, 1946. This 
lease is set out in full in the opinion of this Court on 
former appeal (197 P. 2d 125). 
The first question as to the roof arose in July or 
August of 1945 (536), when respondents became dis-
satisfied with the roof drain system, as he testified (542), 
and kept insisting that Mr. White ''assume the respon-
sibility for diveTting this drain." Respondent claimed 
that the drain was not carrying the water sufficiently 
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a,,·ny. so that son1e \Vas g·etting into an unexcavated por-
tion of the base1nent, fl"~om \vhich son1e allegedly seeped 
through the foundation into the basement, and he pro-
posed t\vo plans for correcting this (792). 
The plan he \\·anted \Vas to tap the roof drain under 
the floor of the building·, at the western extremity of 
the building, and then run a pipe through the basement, 
and di~harge the water at the front of the building (792). 
Respondent said he wanted to have a ~'free flow of rain 
water a'\\.,.ay from the building as . . . the function of 
any roof'' ( 610). 
On the change proposed by respondent, he employed 
a roofer, and communicated that fact to appellant (541). 
On October 9, 1945, ap,pellant wrote a letter (Ex. "H") 
to respondent, stating that he had had "the flashings of 
the roof fixed, and the Utah Roof Cement Comp~any 
advises that the roof is now in good shape." Mr. B. T. 
Cannon, the manager of that company, testified to this, 
and that he had made the· examination and check of the 
roof, as referred to in this letter (785). That it was then 
in good condition. 
Under date of November 12, 1945, resp,ondent ob-
tained from a l\ir. Ferguson figures for making the 
drain changes proposed. These are contained in Ex. 
18, addressed to Mr. White. They included additional 
pipe, and other equipment, and a drain or drip gutter 
at the rear of the building. The total cost of this pro-
posed change, as stated therein, was $485.86. 
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Respondent testified that Mr. White said that he 
would not go fior it, but did offer to make a compromise 
to go 50-50, and that respondent told him ''that it was a 
small item; if I thoug·ht the roof was my responsi,bility, 
I would fix it myself'' (542). Mr. White testified that 
respondent did ask him to pay the amount of the bill, 
and that he asked respondent if he did not remember the 
discussi1on at the time the lease between them was made, 
in which Mr. White said that he was confident that if he 
cared to go to the expense and trouble of partitioning 
the store, 'he would get $1,200.00 m.onthly rent instead 
of the $600.00, as provided in the lease for the first ten 
years, and that he was leasing it "as is" to avoid the 
work and expense ''that had to be done to make this old 
building into a modern store" (795). 'That it was not 
"his duty to reconstruct" the drain system (697). That 
I 
conversation was in November of 1945, seven months 
bef~re occupancy. 
Except for the testimony of respondent and archi-
tect Paulson that they were in and out of the building 
during 1945 ·and early 1946, to make measurements, etc., 
the next testimony in the record is that Mr. Paulson had 
determined to get rid of the floor radiators, about 7 in 
number, that were in the store, and to insulate the attic 
' I 
for heating purposes (293). That he went into the attic 
in January of 1946, and concluded that the roof or 
ceiling structure would not support th·e additional 4 
lbs. per square foot, which this insulation would impose 
(294). 
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On January 15, 1946, he wrote to Mr. Wolfe (Ex. 7), 
hereinabove referred to, as to the drain, and also said 
that the '•trussed rafters which form the roof franling 
are way undersized for the load they now carry. The 
girders bet\Yeen the colu1nns at the rear are also under 
sized.'' Further he said, • ~The skylights greatly weaken 
the roof, saxne should be done away with and the trusses 
carried through present area occup,ied by the skylights.'' 
The testiinony of architect Miller, as referred to, 
"Ta8 that prior t~o the remodeling job in 1922 there had 
been 9 skylig·hts. That 3 were then taken out and trussed 
through, and that 6 remained (630). This witness also 
testified that on the remodeling job which he did at that 
tirne, the remodeling plans and specifications were filed 
\Yith the City, and approved, and a permit issued (629). 
This was the plan and the remodeling under City super-
vision, that existed there at the time that the lHase in 
question was made. About Jan. 15, 1946, Mr. Paulson 
called in the Building Inspector to talk over the condi-
tions, as mentioned in this letter, and the Inspector asked 
him to ''send it to me in writing'' (296). 
Pursuant to this, the letter of Jan. 15, 1'946 (Ex. 
6), appears to have been written to the InspHctor, and 
which contains substantially the same statements as to the 
drain and other conditions that were made to Mr. Wolfe 
in Ex. 7. 
The next was in a letter from the Building Inspector 
to Mr. White, ,Jan. 22, 1946 (Ex. 2), in which the Inspec-
tor 1nade the same statements, in almost the sarne lan-
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12 
guage, as to the structural defects, and in which he also 
said that he believed ''this condition is not safe and 
should be corrected. In case of a heavy snow, it will be 
necessary to cl1ose the building from public use. ' ' The 
building w·a.s continuously occupied by the Stewart Nov-
elty Company up to June 6, 19·46 (802). 
On March 11, 1946, respondent wrote to Mr. White 
(Ex. "I"), enclosing Mr. Paulson's letter to him (Ex. 
7). This was apparently the first communication between 
them since the oral conversation of Nov. 19, 1945. This 
letter of March 12, 1946, states, ''knowing how you feel 
about the subject, I hesitated to bring it to your atten-
tion,'' and added that the condition must eventually be 
corrected, and the best time to correct it was before the 
remodeling in June. That plans for "correcting it" 
should be made in advance. This letter als·o recited that 
he wa.s exp·ecting to spend considerably more, and up to 
three times the original estimate of $10,000.00, for re-
modeling, and, ''I am. sp~aring no expense to make this 
location th~ showplace of the West.'' 
It then stated, "I grant that under conditions as 
they n1ow exist I have a good lease,'' and added that 
ap·pellant would he money ahead to make the peTmanent 
roof repairs now. He said that he believed it was appel-
lants' responsibility. 
On March 13, 1946, Mr. White wrote an answer (Ex. 
'' J' '), in which he stated that he wa.s not complaining 
about the lease or the fact that the rent would be more if 
they were to rewrite a lease, and stated that he drew the 
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lease in the strongest \\'"ay possi·ble, so that appellants 
would haYe no further expense with the property, ex-
cept ··Keeping .. the roof in repair. He stated that he 
did not have the lea~e before him, but if Mr. Wolfe would 
look at it, he "\Yould find that it states definitely that 
you accept the pre1nises in the condition they are in,'' 
and that, ''I feel . . . . just as you rightfully are taking 
advantage of the low rental in the lease, you should not 
call upon n1e to alter the terins of the lease.'' He added 
that he could not see that running the pip·eline through 
the basement, as he had requested, was a roof repair, and 
that the rent · '\Yas fixed at the extraordinarily low fig-
ure of $600.00 per month for the equivalent of four store 
rooms." That it was realized that a lot of money would 
have to be spent, and that "It was because I didn't want 
to go to the expense or trouble that I made you this low 
rental.'' 
On March 20, 1946, architect Paulson filed an ap.pli-
cation with the City Inspector for remodeling the front 
of the store. 
On ~1arch 21, 1946, the Building Inspector (whose 
title had been changed) wrote a letter (Ex. "B") to 
~{r. Paulson, referring to the aprplica.tion, and in which 
is repeated, aln1ost word for word, the statements made 
in the previous letters by Mr. Paulson, and continually 
repeated by the Building Inspector, as to the insuffi-
ciency of the rafters and roof framing and the girders 
hPtween the columns at the rear of the store. It was 
also stated that if the store ''is to be under continued 
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' 
occupancy this condition must he remedied and therefore 
your application is .being held in abeyance until assur-
ance is given that the :voof condition will be taken care 
of. A plan showing your proposal will he expected.'' 
This letter states that Mr. White has been notifed, and 
indicates that a copy of this letter was sent to him. 
On Ap·ril 1, 1946, Mr. Wolfe (Ex. "K") answered 
Mr. White's letter of March 13, 1946 (Ex. "J"). This 
letter makes no denial as to the discussion of the mat-
ters of low rental and acceptance tof the building as it 
was, in view of reduced rentals, but does say that Mr. 
Wolfe is not satisfied that Mr. White's conclusions as 
to liability are impartial. He added that he had taken 
the matter up with his attorneys, and then makes a 
formal 
''demand upon the lessors to put the roof of said 
~premises in ~a safe and proper condition, to meet 
with the requirements of the Chief of Building 
Inspection of Salt L.ake City, and also provide the 
proper drainage facilities for said r01of. 
''Unless prompt action is taken to remedy the 
conditions as set forth above, I will cause the 
proper work to he done to make the roof safe and 
in good condition, which is your responsibility 
under the lease, and will institute legal proceed-
ing unde-r the lease to compel lessors to pay for 
the cost of same and attorney fees.'' 
Respondents' attorneys had ''considerable to do'' 
with drafting this demand (See Ex. ''M''). 
It will be noticed that, commencing at about this 
time, or. a little before this, res:pondents and their archi-
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teet had deter1nined that they \Vould get the interior posts 
and construction out of this store entirely, and a full 
span bo,vstring steel ~tructure installed. The evidence 
plainly indicates that they were determined to get such 
construction at the expense of the appellants. 'The fur-
ther efforts \\Tere directed to this, and to collecting evi-
dence of defects in the structure, as it had existed. 
It should ~so be noted that, while the Building In-
~pector had requested assurance that the roof would be 
1nade safe, no such assurance was given hy the architect 
filing the application, or at all. 
On April 2, 1946, Mr. White wrote Mr. Wolfe (Ex. 
· 'L · '), acknowledging his letter of April 1, 1946, and 
stated that he had examined the lease, and then quoted 
some language from the lease, and said : 
''I suggest ... that you send me an itemized 
statement of exactly the -vvork you contend the 
lessors are obligated to do under their agree-
ment to keep the roof in good condition and 
repair." 
He also asked Mr. Wolfe if he would advise who his 
attorney is, so that he might talk to him. 
On April3, 1946, by letter (Ex. ''M''), acknowledged 
Mr. White's letter, and said: 
"With reference to the itemized statement 
which you request stating the exact work to be 
done to make the roof in good condition and re-
pair, this can best be obtained by consulting with 
my architect Mr. A. B. Paulson, or by engaging 
~on1e other co1npetent building engineer or archi-
tect.'' 
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He also added that his attorneys were Rich, Rich and 
Strong, and that ''Benj. L. Rich of this firm ... had 
' considerable voice in rendering the opinion referred to in 
my letter of Aprills~t.' ' 
Mr. Paulson testified that he probably did know 
that Mr. Wolfe, in his letter, had referred Mr. White 
to him (415). He also said that he may have made the 
statement, as testified to ~by Mr. Miller, in substance and 
effect that he "wanted to have a clear span and that 
was generally understood from the beginning, and that 
the expense of it was worth it to the store'' ( 416). That 
he ha:d "told Mr. W1olfe that it would be a shame to 
re-roof this thing without putting a clear span on it''; 
that he told him that ''just p1rior to George Nelson laying 
out the bowstring truss'' ( 416). 
Mr. ·Wolfe testified tha:t he determined, after this 
letter of A p·ril 1, 1946, to p~roceed with fixing the roof 
just as soon ~as he could get-a permit ('556). He also testi-
fied that he was the first to determine that he wanted 
the open span roof; that it was his idea (963). 
At this time, or just prior thereto, Mr. White asked 
the City Inspector to meet him at the building, and this 
was done (813). The Inspector, Mr. Tipton, when they 
walked to the back of the store, -called attention to. a 
girder near the West side of the building, running North 
and South over the balcony. He pointed out that this 
was bowed, and Mr. White could s·ee that it was (814). 
This ceiling wnd1 girde.r, m.entioned in the letters as 
"b~owed," above the balcony, however was never dis-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
turbed, a~ this 'va~ no part of the new n1ain store recon-
~truction. This girder is still there, having been scabbed 
on each side by 2'' pieces ( 527). This is the only timber 
sag that, it \Ya8 agreed on both sides, was visible there. 
It \Vas the sag expressly Inentioned in the architect's 
and Inspector's lette·rs. 
Archi teet _Jliller testified that this was bowed in the 
~a1ne 'Yay, and to the same extent, soon after it was put 
in, back in 1923, and had been in that eondition ever since 
( 632). There is no dispute as to this. 
~Ir. Tipton also pointed out, what he referred to 
as ··a point near the Southwest skylight,'' and asked if 
:Jir. White could not see, by sighting over the ceiling, 
that th'ere \Vas a deflection there. He seemed to see some 
such at this point, and said he could see n'o other deflec-
tion, and asked ~1r. Tipton if he could see any other. He 
then asked what should be done about it, and was told 
by Mr. Tipton that he made no requirements, that they 
would simply pass upon proposals, as they were made 
(818). 
On or about April 4, 1946, pursuant to Mr. Wolfe's 
letter of April 3, 1946, Mr. White went also to see Young 
and Hansen, architects (819), and they advised him that 
l\Iiles Miller had been the archi teet on the remodeling 
job in 1922 and 1923, and recommended that he see Mr. 
Miller (819). 
~fr. White immediately contacted Mr. Mille'r, and 
the two of the1t1 went to see architect Paulson, as had 
been suggested. vVhile Mr. Paulson could not recall 
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the particular visit to his office, he did not deny the con-
versations testified to by Mr. White and Mr. Miller ( 413). 
This wa.s about the 5th of Ap~ril, 1'946. Mr. White called 
Mr. P~aulson's attention to the fact that he had requested 
a statement as to what he should do, and had been re-
ferre~d by Mr. Wolfe to Mr. Paulson. Mr. White then 
stated that there were two distinct questions involved: 
one was, what work is there to be done on this roof struc-
ture; and the next one was, who was to pay for it. The 
last question was one for_ him and Mr. Wolfe to work 
out, and, on the first question, he would like these two 
architects to discuss the question as to what was to be 
done, and t1o come to a conclusion, and advise on that 
(821). 
Mr. Miller, at· that time, made :a statement as to 
what was required, suggesting that the skylights be 
trussed in, and, if there was any shoring necessary 
around the skylights, he suggested this he done, and, 
if there was any strengthening neeessary, they could 
go through and do this (822). 
Mr. White then said for Mr. Paulso:r;t to go :ahead 
on this p~roposal. ( 823). Mr. Paulson was not clear as 
to this conversation, but testified that Mr. White "may 
have suggested this" ( 416), and, also, that the foregoing 
conversation with Mr. Miller and Mr. White ''could have 
taken place''- ( 413). It was agreed that it was not dis-
cussed further by Mr. Paulson with Mr. White ( 418). 
Mr. White testified that he waited to hear from Mr. 
Paulsnn the outcome of the proposals made by 1\f.r. Mil-
ler (827). 
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On .. A .. pril 22, 1946, res:pondent and Mr. Paulson em-
ployed Georg·e S. Nelson, a construction engineer ( 360). 
He testified that the roof wa8 unsafe, and had been since 
it \\~as designed on the plans approved in 1922. All of his 
testimony \vas 'vith relation to this design and the alleged 
faulty re1nodeling construction based thereon. 
On .. A .. pril 29, 1946, the Building Inspector wrote an-
other letter to ~Ir. Wolfe (Ex. "C "), referring to future 
occupancy of the store, and stating that he had called 
to the attention of .:Jir. White, as lessor, the same things 
that had been repeated from the first letter of Mr. 
PatllS'on, as to inadequacy of design and construction; 
and then stated that it would be mandatory for him to 
refuse to allow continued occupancy beyond the summer, 
for fear of future heavy snow loading, which might cause 
collapse. , 
:Jir. George Nelson wrote a letter May 8, 1946 (Ex. 
'' F' '). This tends to indicates that no part of this roof 
would ever hold up. This witness testified that he went 
in, prior to the removal of the ceiling plaster, for one 
hour, and didn't remember what part of the roof struc-
ture he got into (334). His testimony related to the1oreti-
cal requirements and computations, and to the insuffi-
ciency of timber, nails and fastenings, as referred to in 
Ex. '' F' '. He said the roof structure ''couldn't hold 
up," and that "it shouldn't be standing at all" (334). 
That it should have fallen down "years ago" (336). 
H'owevrr, he found no changes from the original con-
struction. He stated that the roof could be sup,ported, 
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as it stood, but this would be impractical (357), and that 
an open span construction would make a ''prettier store'' 
(332). This witness testified that he made a sketch, and 
that Mr. Paulson thereon drew the plan for the open 
store (331). 
On June 14, 1946, Mr. Paulson wrote to Mr. Wolfe 
(Ex. "E"), stating that the Inspe~tor would not g~rant 
j 
a building permit until a plan for a "code conforming" 
roof were submitted. That complete measured drawings 
showed the roof East of the balcony, "using :S:alt Lake 
City Code as a standa;rd," to be entirely unsafe, "with 
exceptions of the columns.'' He stated that to make it 
safe would cost m'Ore than to remove the p-resent roof and 
to '' p~ut 'On a good roof.'' He estimated, however, .a roof 
without posts at $11,-680.00 cost, and a new one, using 
present columns and new beams, etc., at $9,058.00. 'That 
the first scheme would be the hest, hecause it would 
brace the front wall, which might be a hazard in case of 
earthquake. 
Mr. White, not having heard from Mr. Paulson with 
relation to Mr. Miller's suggestion, w·ent to the premises 
about June 7, 1946, when respondents had just gone into 
occupancy (827). It was about this time that he heard of 
the ptroject for full span open store (826). He then went 
again to see the firm of Young and Hansen, architects. 
and went with them to look at the building. It was at this 
time that they looked for plaster cracks in the store ceil-
ing (828), and found that there were none due to deflec-
tion (830). It may be stated at this point that all the 
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expert~ te~tified that if there \vas substantial deflection, 
the ceiling would crack, and no \Yitness testified that the 
ceiling had cracked in any part of the main store. 
It 'vas testified, 'vithout dis:pute, that the drain sys-
tem had not been changed fron1 the tin1e that Mrs. White 
acquired the property (790), and, also, that the ceiling 
was plastered at the tin1e the property was acquired, and 
not replastered since. There was no testimony of any 
change in any portion of the structure, after the lease 
was signed and up to the time of occupancy, or to the 
time of demolition, by reas-on of any further ''sagging,'' 
as alleged, or at all. What testimony was given on this 
question w'·as all to the effect that there had been no 
change. 
After the above inspection, Mr. White talked to Mr. 
Wolfe and asked if Mr. Wolfe would discuss the matter 
with his architect and with Young and Hansen; that the 
latter firm had convinced him that the roof could be made 
safe at relatively small cost ( 832). Mr. Wolfe responded 
that he would not so meet; that he had employed archi-
tects and engineer, and was going t1o follow their advice. 
On June 17, 1946, Mr. Nelson, the engineer, wrote 
another letter (Ex. '' G' ') to Mr. Wolfe. This referred to 
the previous letter, of May 8, 1946, and that he had sub-
mitted two plans to Mr. Paulson ''for replacing this 
roof"; that he recommended "rebuilding with a fresh 
start." 
On ,June 18, 1946, attorneys Rich, Rich and Str"ong 
\Vrote a letter to Mr. White (Ex. XX), enclosing the last 
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previously mentioned letter from G·eorge S. Nelson, and, 
also, from Mr. Paulson, and stating that it would .cost 
more ''to monkey with the old roof than a new roof 
will .cost," and also stating that "it is the plan and 
arrangement to proceed at once with the alterations, in-
cluding the replacement of a roof . . . '' 
On June 22, 1946, an applicant by respondents was 
made for remodeling, including the op,en span. bowstring 
structure (Ex. "0"). 
p·rior to July 8, 1946, Mr. White had a conversation. 
with Mr. Wolfe, which was the first negotiations that 
they had had since the letter of April 3, 1946, when Mr. 
Wolfe had said that he did not want to argue about the 
matter anymore. In this conversation, aborve referred 
to, Mr. Wolfe had said that Young and Hansen could 
write out their proposal (833-). 
On July 8, 19·46, Mr. White wrote Mr. Wolfe (Ex. 
'' P ''), submitting a letter, also of July 8, 1946, from 
Young and Hansen (Ex. ''P''), and asked him to sub-
mit their plan to the Building Inspector, and also stat-
ing that the roof could he tested by loading, and asking 
that it he tested, if necessary, to satisfy the City, and 
stating that it would stand, as it had stood, for over 20 
years. Also, that testing ·for the plaster cracks had re-
vealed that there had been no movement or settlement 
of the roof structure. 
The enclosed letter of Young and H·ansen (Ex. "P") 
stated that the roof was safe. That there was a little 
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sagging around the skylights. That close inspection re-
Yealed no recent crack8. That the roof could he n1ade 
stronger by trussing~ through and eliminating the sky-
lights. That the cost 'Of the changes suggested would 
not exceed $800.00. 
I1nmediately thereafter, respondents had Mr. Paul-
son dra\Y a blue print (Ex. '~ P' '), which, it was claimed, 
suggested the plan of Young and Hansen, but it did not 
show the joists running through the skylight from girder 
to wall, as had been suggested, although it seems this 
\vas intended; and this, with the Young and Hansen 
letter, and a portion of Mr. White's letter (Ex. "P" and 
Ex. 1), ''"'"ere submitted with the applicati'On . 
.. At this point, the insistence of respondents on hav-
ing this open span roof becomes even more ap;parent, 
because the respondents submitted with the above, a 
letter signed by Cannon Construction Company (Ex. 
"'P") of July 9, 1946, and they also submitted with this 
the letter 'Of GeorgeS. Nelson (Ex. "P" and Ex. "F"), 
giving his opinion as to insufficienty of nailing, etc., 
and in the letter to the Building Inspector said: ''the 
framing to replace the skylights, as the plan shows, be 
id entica.l to the existing framing, and the nailin,g would 
be as in the existing trusses." This was to invite rejec-
tion. 
~l_lhe letter by Mr. White to Mr. Wolfe had said 
nothing ahout nailing, nor had the letter of Young and 
Hansen. 1\f r. Miller had suggested strengthening where 
necessary. No one had suggested keeping the "identical" 
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skylight framing. They had suggested_running the regu-
lar truss system through instead. It was suggested, that 
any needed additional nailing would be made, or, if neces-
sary, they could go in without removing the plaster and, 
using an electric bit, holt, any CJonnections at a total of 
all costs not to exceed $500.00 ( 799'). 
On July 11, 1946, the Building Inspector, naturally 
enough, wrote Cannon Construction 'Company (Ex. 
"Q"), stating that this plan, as so submitted, was not 
acceptable ''in that it does not supply the necessary 
detail for checking,'' and quoting a portion of the Build-
ing Code, required that stress diagrams he furnished. 
Re:Spondents did nothing further on this, and did 
not advise Mr. White that this ap·plication had been made 
or so questioned (837). Mr. White left Salt Lake City 
July 11, 1946, and was gone until about July 27, or 28, 
1946. Upon his return, he talked with the Building In-
spector, who sta.ted that he had written this letter of 
July 11, 1946, and he read this to Mr. White over the 
telephone (839'). He immediately called on Young and 
Hansen, and had them contact the Building Inspector as 
to w~at was wanted as to st:r;-ess diagrams (840). Mr. 
White instructed Young and Hansen to go ahead imme-
diately with the stress ·charts, which they did, and to 
take any other action necessary (844). 
Prior t'O the foregoing, and on July 2, 1946, pursuant 
to the plan of June 22, 1946 (Ex. "0"), negotiations 
had bee:n. commenced to purchase the steel for the open 
span (934). Bids were taken, and one closed on July 19, 
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1~).±() ( 5:22), and the steel furnished and installed Aug. 
14, 1946 (93-±). 
It is apparent that there \vas a conflict between the 
\\Titnesses on both sides, as to whether the old roof struc-
ture ''Tas safe or co1nplied \Yith the present Code require-
Inents, at least for a ~ew roof structure. The Code 
requirements were not involved. 
\\T e have not gone into detail as to this conflict, 
because it is not Inaterial to the points raised, and the 
jury would apparently have the exclusive right to re-
solve such conflicts, if they were material. Also, because 
the jury was finally, and correctly, instructed that no 
liability arose under the Code or from any act 'Or finding 
of the Building Inspector (149). 
\\~ e have not gone into detail as to the testimony of 
xir. Wolfe or Mr. White further than to show their re-
spective contentions. It was Mr. White's CJontention that 
he was not required, by the lease, to make or pay for 
the changes, alterations, and new construction to replace 
the existing roof. It was Mr. Wolfe's contention, 
throughout his testimony ( 533-615), and as italicized 
in his letters above, that appellants were required to, 
and refused to, ''put'' in a safe ·or code complying roof, 
or to ''make'' such a roof, or to ''construct'' such a roof 
in good conditi'On or repair. There is little foundati'On 
for his recital of conversations, and he was hard to pin 
down. This, however, is the general effect of his testi-
Inony. It was the issue then and now. 
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Before the. stress charts on the Y'Oung and Hansen 
proposal to strengthen the roof with removing the ~il-
l 
ing were delivered, demolition had begun on July 2, 19f6, 
by tearing out the ceiling (Ex. 13). It became apparent, 
and the contractor told Mr. White, that they were going 
ahead on the open span roof structure. Demolition started 
at the West side of the store building, and continued from 
there Eastwardly to the sidewalk, as shown by the 
pictures. The old interior and roof supporting structure 
was taken out, a piece of timber at a time. 
During the process, the pictures introduced by re-
spondents 'Yere taken, admittedly to show alleged defects 
in the construction, and ftor use upon the trial of the 
case. Which, Mr. Wolfe had said on Ap·ril 3, 1946, he 
intended to bring ( 486, 49~6). These pictures do not dis-
close any substantial deflection anywhere, and show the 
laminated girde·rs as perfectly straight. All of the struc-
ture, except the posts which were admittedly sufficient, 
was above the ceiling. Any of this could have been 
strengthened, if necessary, as was the girder over the 
mezzanine balcony. 
The new constructi!on followed, and was completed 
by the middle of November, 1946 ( 478). 
The foregoing statement of this large record ap,pears 
to be sufficient for an understanding of the questions 
presented on appeal. 
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ERRORS RELIED UJ?ON 
1. Failure to recognize and apply the la\v that a 
party ''Tho, for a consideration, accepts a building in the 
condition and state of repair it is then in, cannot demand 
or 1nake changes and alterations of these exact struc-
tural conditions and charge the cost thereof to the other 
party. And, in denying plaintiffs' motions and requests 
for instruction, and, in fact, instructing contrary to the 
law, both as to: 
(a) The existing roof drain system, and 
(b) the supporting roof understructure. 
2. Failure to instruct that the covenant to keep the 
roof in repair did not obligate appellants to put it in a 
·different or better condition, and in ruling and instruct-
ing to the contrary. 
3. Failure and refusal tJO· instruct on, or to submit 
appellants' theory, that, since the roof of the building 
did not get out of the condition and state of repair ac-
cepted, the duty, if any, of defendants was only to sup-
port the existing roof. 
4. Error in submitting case on a misleading f'oTm 
of verdict, suggesting and inviting the assessment of 
damages, in disregard of the legal duty or delict of ap-
pellants. 
!J. Error In denying appellants' motion for a di-
rected verdict; and, also, for a new trial. 
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6. T·ha.t the evidence does not sustain the verdict 
and judgment against appellants, and same are contrary 
to law. 
('These errors will be made more specific In the 
argumeni.) 
POINTS DISCUSSED 
The controlling questions involved and raised will 
be argued and supported under the· following points : 
I. A lease -covenant to acc:ept, in the condition it is 
then in, an old building for remodeling into a new store, 
is a binding covenant, both: 
a. as to the then existing.roof ·drain system, and 
b. as to then existing pillars, beams, trusse·s, and 
other structural roof supporting system. 
II. In a lease, the terms to ''keep'' in repair and to 
''put'' in repair are words o.f separate and distinctly 
different meaning. The agreement to do the former, 
imposes no duty as to the later, and vice versa. The use 
of terms such as ''good,'' in reference to ·condition or 
repair, add nothing to the -covenants. 
III. Since the roof did not change, or get out of 
repair, the only duty of the defendants could he, in any 
event, to support it as it was, and the jury should have 
been so instructed, and this theory submitted. 
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A CO·\TEN.A.NT OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE EX-
ISTING CONDITION IS BINDING. 
It would seen1 that no principles 1n the extensive 
field of landlord and tenant law are better settled than, 
a. that acceptance of a building in the condition 
that it is in 'vhen accepted, precludes any right to have 
such eondition changed by, or at the expense of, the other 
party; and 
b. that an agreement to ''keep'' a leased building 
in the condition in which it is accepted imposes no obli-
gation to ''put" it into an improved or better con.dition, 
by construction -of improvements, or at all. 
In this field, also, the p~rinciples,, well established 
by well considered precedents over a long p·eriod of liti-
gation, have been found to furnish rules which worked 
for justice and avoid confusion, and where judicial legis-
lation would necessarily be confusing and dangerous. 
~fany cases, some of which fnllow, emphasize this. 
This case has always been colored, perhaps neces-
sarily, by a speculative assumption, emphasized hy re-
spondent Wolfe throughout his testimony, that whatever 
improvements defendants are here compelled to pay for 
will redound to their benefit anyway; that, therefore, 
nothing else in the case is of any great importance. 
Tt is clear that this "showplace of the West" store 
is intended for use, as such, by respondents for the 20 
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years, as authorized by this lease. It is showTI that the 
building will then he between 60 and 70 years old. The 
pictures and evidence show that right back to the rear 
balcony, the entire building, except the North and South 
walls, was torn out and rebuilt at a cost of more than 
$515,000.00, including the new steel roof structure ( 553). 
There is no assuranc.e that these old 1% foot side walls 
will support this 80-foot s;pan (Ex. 8) bowstring steel 
roof structure beyond that lease period. Effort to go into 
this was objected to, and, of course, none of the phases 
of this speculative assumption .could be gone into. 
It is speculative as to whether merchandizing prac-
tice 20 years hence will make unrentable a sto-re like 
this, in this business section; whether it can be rentably 
partitioned under this oval roof. It is common know-
ledge that each $5,000.00 added to the value will add 
about $300.00 to defendants' tax bill annually, so that 
$50,000.00 added value would add $.3,000.00, as well as 
additional insurance eost, to ap·pellants. If this kind of 
a constructed building, at thi~ location, had been wanted 
by appellants for their advantage, they could have made 
it. Such a choice should not have been forced upon them, 
in any part, by judicial legislation. 
We come now to the law, as we have found it. In 
view of the specific covenant, accepting this building 
in its then condition, it would seem unnecessary to cite 
again authorities referred to in our ·brief on the first 
appeal to the effect that without this strict covenant but 
' 
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by entering into a lease, the lessee i~ usually bound by 
the condition of the property at the ti1n·e of the lease. 
Tiffany, Lan-dlord (l/flid Tenant, p. 86, on this, says: 
.. It i~ agreed b~~ the authorities at the present 
tin1e that a~ a general rule there is no obligation 
on the part of the le~~or to ~ee that the premises 
are at the ti1ne of the deu1ise in a. condition of 
fitne~~ for use for the purposes for which the 
les~ee 1nay propose to use them. A lessee, like 
the purcha~er of a thing already in existence, is 
prestuned to ·take only after examination. The 
nlaxinz ca.veat e·rnptor applies, and if he desires 
to protect hin1self in this regard he must exact 
of the lessor an express stipulation as to the con-
dition of the premises. Accordingly a landlord is 
not bound, as a general rule, in the absence of 
special stipulation, to make repairs or improve-
Inents on the premises in order to render then1 
safe or fit the1n for the tenant's use." 
This court approved this rule on the first appeal. 
Also in our brief on first appeal, we cited authori-
ties for the prop·ositi:on that the accep·tance of a building, 
as is, included the acceptance of any structural defects, 
and that this would also go to any subsequent changes 
resulting from these then existing defects. 
On these, we quoted 32 Am. Jur., p. 515, as follows: 
''A lessee takes the hired premises, in the 
absence of warranty, fraud, or 1nisrep-resentation, 
in the condition and qualit:v in which they are. 
The tenant takes the property as he finds it, \vith 
all existing defects which he knovvs or can ascer-
tain by reasonable inspection. He takes the risk 
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of apparent defects. As between hiins.elf and his 
landlord, where there is no fraud or false repre-
sentation or deceit, and in the absence of an ex-
press warranty or covenant to repair, there is no 
implied contract that the prernises are suitable 
or fit for :occupation or for the particular use 
intended, or that they are safe for use. Any im-
plied contract relates only to the estate, 'and not 
to the condition, of the property. In other words, 
in the ahs.ence of fraud or concealment :on the part 
of the landlord, a rule similar to that of caveat 
emptor applies and throws upon the lessee the re-
sponsibility of examining as to the existence of 
defects in the premises and of providing against 
their ill effects. The gerner"<al rule that there is no 
·warranty of fitn.ess or as to the conditvon .of the 
premises jwpvplies to d.efects in the construction of 
the demised buildilng ;and to the p~remises le.ased 
for business purposes.'' 
While such authority was not discussed much by 
this Court, this last contention was not adopted. How-
ever, it need not be pursued further. The only point in 
this connection that is of importance, now tha.t it has 
been firmly established that there was no change of any 
kind after the lease was entered into, is that the alleged 
defects complained of and, allegedly, corrected were 
structural ones, existing from the time of remodeling in 
1923. 
Another matter which ap~peared to influence the 
decision of this Court, in ruling upon the demurrer, and 
which is emphasized in the opinion (197 P. 2,d 130, par. 
1; p. 131, par. 4) was what this Court termed ''require-
ment of building authorities.'' 
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, .. V"ltile the reference and the authorities cited there-
for in these paragraphs did not a:ppear to us to support 
the Court's conclusions, as to any such requirement 
that Inight have beeo1ne involved under the circumstances 
here, this phase is entirely out of the case now, under 
the 9th instruction of the Court ( 149) that ~'the defen-
dants, only obligation was as provided in the lease,'' and 
\vhich has elintinated any liability arising out of any 
alleged or assumed requirements of building authorities. 
Another point \Yhich we raised, and which need not 
be considered now, is the point that a covenant to keep in 
repair a portion of a building, which was later demol-
ished, leaves nothing on which the covenant to rep~air 
can operate. 
Another point urged on the appeal, and discussed 
at length by this Court ( p. 131, par. 3), need not be con-
~idered on this appeal, for reasons which will he amp~li­
fied under Point II. This dealt with the "last 10 year" 
provision of the lease. 
We have referred to the above matters for the pur-
poses of clarification as to the former opinion, and to 
narrow the issues to the points which we consider are 
now determinative of the case on the record here. 
It cannot be too forceably emphasized that there was 
no warranty of fitness of this building by a,ppellarnt,s. 
None can be implied, and there is none in the le~ase. 
The covenant of acceptance, for a valuable consider-
ation, of the building in the ''condition and state of 
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rep~air '' it is in, also plainly negatives any such conten-
tion. 
In the case of Robinson v. Wilson (Wash. 1918), 173 
P. 331, the Court says : 
''We think it will not be questioned that the 
landlord is not a guarantor of the fitness of a 
building for the purpose for which it is leased, 
unless he binds himself by written contract.'' 
The Court quotes with approval the statement from 
Tiffany on Landlord arn.d T e'I'IAa/nt, P'· 86, as we quote it 
above. 
The Court then continues : 
''The trouble in this case is that we are asked 
to make a can-tract grounded in the equities inci-
dent to subsquent events, where the parties who 
might have forseen eveTy incident and circum-
stances now relied on failed to guard against 
them in their written contract ... It may at times 
result in inequity, but the law is written that the 
landlord is not bound beyond the terms of his 
lease, and the parties who enter into written con-
tracts are presumed to have in contemplation 
probable consequence and the established princi-
ples of the law.'' 
I- (a)- THE DRAIN 
This phase will he considered first. 
The allegations as to the roof drain are generally 
that it was inadequate to take the water off the roof, 
thereby adding weight thereto (38), and did not take 
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the "·ater a \Yay fro1n the building, so that the sa1ne 
seeped into the basement. 
The evidence sho\vs that respondents first wanted 
a "dra\Y or drip gutter'" at the rear, a pipe line fro1n 
the rear to the front of the building, and something to 
n1ake a free flo\Y of water away from the building, and 
their architect suggested the need of additional drains 
(Ex. 7). 
Respondent ,\ ... olfe's correspondence and testimony 
on this matter is summed up in his demand that respon-
dents ''put the roof . . . in safe and proper condition'' 
and make the roof safe and in good condition.'' The 
respondents allegedly did this by taking out the old struc-
ture and putting in a new one. 
The evidence is conclusive that these drain condi-
tions as comp~lained of, were then exactly and in every 
respect as they were when the lease was signed, and 
\vhen this roof was installed in 1937, and as it was until 
torn out. 
It is appellants' contention that, under the law 
and these allegations and the evidence, respondents did 
not have the right to require them to construct any of 
the additional improvements first demanded, or to re-
construct the building structure, as was done. That the 
Trial Court, by the instructions, erroneoulsy adopted the 
theory that respondents had such a right, and that appel-
lant had the duty to comply with his de1nands, and that 
the jury could find that their failure to do so constituted 
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an actionable delict. No ap~pellate Court, and no author-
ity on this subject, we believe, has so held. 
As there will be no question as to this point being 
fully reserved, we simply refer to the recorded cita-
tions ~above i:ri the "History of Litigation," and to our 
exceptions ( 993-9'94), to the instructions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13 
and 14 at the pages above cited. The exceptions to the 
failure to give the instructions referred to were taken 
(994-995). 
Our request for special interrogatories, asking the 
jury if there had been any change, was denied (116), 
as was our se~parate motion, at the end, to withdraw 
from consideration by the jury all questions of liability 
relating to the drain, on the grounds therein stated, and 
to which we call the Court's attention now (973)w 
The form of verdict on which the case went to the 
jury (165), over our objection (996), plainly indicates 
to the jury that it was to so proceed and to assess dam-
ages; that we were charged with liability, regardless of 
the conditions accepted, and with the obligati'Ons of ''put-
tJiJng the roof in good condition and repair." After re-
citing that, if the jurors "find the issues in favor of 
the plaintiffs . . . render verdicts as follows.'' 'This 
recites: 
''1. With respe·ct to putting the roof in good 
condition and repair we render our verdict in 
favor ·of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants 
on account thereof in the sum of $----------------·'' 
It goes on in the same way as to other of respondents' 
claims for damages. 
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So that, the right of respondents clain1ed, and a.s 
adopted and sustained by the Court, and on which dam-
ag·es \Yere assessed, \vas the right, after acceptance for 
adequate consideration of this old building in the condi-
tion it was in, to turn right around and demand that it 
be dput," "Inade, •• or ~~placed" in a different condition. 
Such condition as the jury might consider "good condi-
tion and repair,'' and to require us to ''remedy amy 
defects," if any there were (145-146), and to "make it 
reasonable safe and adequate" (147). 
We will now support the contention that the respon-
' dents, under this lease, did not have such a right, and 
that we are, therefore, entitled to p~revail on this point. 
A stronger covenant of acceptance of conditions 
could hardly be drawn. The contract said (11): 
"6. In consideration of the rental herein 
fixed, the Lessees agree to and do hereby accept 
said premises in the condition and state of repair 
th . " ey are now In, . . . 
If this is not an acceptance of all the structural eondi-
tions, then, it would seem, there could be no case in which 
such covenant could he made effective. 
The evidence, as shown in the statement supra, em-
phasizes that both parties clearly understood that this 
rental consideration was substantial and important in 
entering into this constract. This is n'Ot in disp·ute. 
The first case that we shall rely upon on this, and 
thP other points raised, is the decision of this Court in 
this case on first appeal ( 197 P. 2d 125). This decision 
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will be more a.pprop.riately analyzed in the next division 
(b) under this point I. We cannot see that there was 
anything ne:c.essarily decided, or that wa.s decided, which 
would give the right to respondent, as claimed and al-
lowed on the trial, })1articularly now that the claim based 
on ''requirements of building authorities,'' as referred 
to in the opinion of th~s court, and on which it was misled, 
was no longer in the case. 
Urnderhill, Landlord & Tenarn.t~ Page 782: 
"In the lease of a factory, store, dwelling or other -
building, there is no imp·lied warranty on the part of 
the landlord that the building is safe, tenantable or 
reasonably suitable for the purpose for which it is to 
be used by the lessee, nor is there any implied warranty 
that it shall continue to be fit for the purpose to which 
the lessee intends to put it. In the ahsenc.e of fraud or 
concealment by the landlord at the time of the letting 
of the condition of the building,· the rule of caveat emptor 
applies.'' 
Kingste,ad v. Wright County, 133 N. W. 3'99: 
Here the covenant was ''to keep the building In 
repair.'' Question was who was liable f:or the cost of 
putting in a drain and sewer connection. 
The :court said: 
''This did not impose upon him an obligation 
to make improvements or betterments. Harris v. 
Corlies, 41 N.W. 940, 2 L.R.A. 349. The defendant 
took the pre1nises in their eondition when the 
contract was rnade, the building was not then out 
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of repair, and the covenant for repairs can be re-
ferred only to 8UCh defects in the building as 
subsequent!~~ a ro8e, injury or drunage arising 
fro1n the elements, or natural decay incident to 
the property and its use. The fact that the build-
ing at the tiine the contract was entered into had 
no se,Yer eonnection or drain to carry off water 
con1ing into the base1nent did not render it out 
of repair \Yithin the 1neaning of the contract. 
Such a drain was no part of the premises and to 
put one in ,,~ould constitute not a repair but an 
i1nproven1ent and clearly not required under the 
covenant to keep in repair. 34 Cyc. 1336, 24 Cyc. 
1028.'' 
W·alker v. Cosgrove (Ky. 1925), 273 S.W. 450: 
Tenant agreed to take g·ood care of said prroperty, to 
cause or permit no waste, to pay for all ordinary rep-airs. 
The Court said: 
''If the property was in had shape and the 
drainage pipes were in a dilapidated condition at 
the time appellee Cosgrove leased the premises 
from Perkins, we do not think he was obligated 
under his contract to restore the waste pip·e. It was 
not the duty of the tenant to add a drain pipe 
\vhere none had been before or make new one 
that was decayed and useless at the time he went 
into possession, hut only to make ordinary repairs 
such as resulted from and were made necessary 
by and from reasonable use of the premises.'' 
Hartris v. Lewiston Trust Co. (Pa) 191 A. 34, 110 
A.L.R. 749: 
"We have held repeatedly that a tenant takes 
the property as he finds it, with all existing de-
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fects which he knows ·or can ascertain by reason-
able inspection. This is so even though the prem-
ises are in a condition called ruinous. Robbins 
v. Jones, 15 C. B. (N.S.) 221, 240. 'Vhere the 
entire possession and enjoyment of property are 
transferred by landlord to tenant, the rule 'Of 
caveat emptor applies. As was said by 1\fr. Jus-
tice Sharswood in Moore v. Weber, 71 Pac., 429, 
10 Am. Rep. 708, 'The lessee's eyes are his bar-
gain. He is bound to examine the premises he 
rents, and secure himself by covenants, to repair 
and rebuild. ' ' ' 
DriV'er v. M axw·ell, 56 Ga. 11 : 
Under Georgia statute the duty to repair was on 
the landlord. In this case it was held : 
'' * * *· where the premises, by reason of 
patent defects, known alike to both parties, are, 
at the time they are ·offered for rent, out of repair 
and unfit for safe or comfortable use, the tenant 
ought to reject them if he is not satisfied to ac-
cept them as they are ; and if he does accept them, 
no matter what price he· agrees to pay, the land-
lord, in the absence of a special undertaking to 
do more, should be held for such repairs only as 
become requisite to keep the property in as good 
condition as when it was rented. He may well 
say to the tenant, 'you knew what you got; I 
offered my property as it was, and did not hold 
it out to you for more than it was.'' In such a 
transaction all the conditions of fair dealing are 
met and satisfied.'' 
Justice Holmes in the case of O'M·alley v. Tw·enty-
Five Associates, (Mass.) 60 N.E. 387, held: 
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""But zrhen .. attention has been directed~ in an.y 
1cay to the con.dition of th~gs at the beginning 
of the lease, it ha~ been recognized as the general 
rule that the tenant n1ust take things as he finds 
the1n, and if they are unsafe, cannot com::plain. 
There is no in1plied undertaking or duty on the 
landlord's part to n1ake things better than they 
are.'' 
Dwight v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 128 Mass. 280: 
The lessor covenanted to ''repair and renew'' so far 
as necessary the gutter of a mill. Court held tha.t it was 
obligated to make such repairs and renewals as were 
necessary in order that the existing gutter would do 
all that it was capable of doing when it was in good con-
dition according to the original construction. ·The Les-
sor, however, was not required to build a new gutter or 
a different construction even though the plan of the ori-
ginal gutter was defective. 
The cases cited under the next division (b) also 
support this one. 
I- (b) -STRUCTURAL DEFECTS 
While this phase does not very fundamentally differ 
from (a), there are different cases applicable directly 
to each of these points, and a little more chance that ·some 
claim of change as alleged, after the lease, might have 
heen looked for under (b). However, we have found 
nothing in the record of any such change, not by the 
loRs of even a nail. The testimony of respondents' theo-
retical expert, G-eorge S. Nelson (309-365), particularly 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
emphasizes that the defects claimed were those in the 
original design and construction only. This is confirmed, 
but nowhere, we believe, contruverted. 
The typical extracts quoted by this Court froin the 
the complaint, in discussing City requirements, are all 
of allegations (:p. 126) such as rafters being ''over-
stressed,'' and ''girders . . . undersized,'' and ''trusses 
not adequate, both a.s to design and erection,'' and (;p. 
130) ''beams evidently too light,'' So that the question 
here again is, can such an old building be accepted 
''in' the condition and sta.te of repair'' it is then in, and 
a party immediately assert the right to have it changed 
and reconstructed. 
And, also, after so constructing differently and at 
great expense to the other party, continue the right of 
use of the building .at the sam.e low· rentals fix.ed, as con-
sideration for such covenant of acceptance, and, also, im-
pose the ·additional atnrY~~~J;al t1a:xes .and insurance expense 
thereby cr:e:ated. 
Wolfe v. Whit.e, 197 P. (2) 125: 
We think that the assumption by respondents and 
the Trial Court that this Court, on first appeal, com-
mitted itself to this erroneous doctrine is not justified by 
what was said in the opinion. Such commitment would 
be contrary to previous decisions nf this Court, cited 
herein, as well a.s to the settled law in other jurisdictions. 
This Court had then only to decide whether the re-
spondents, on all their pleadings, could make out a case 
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belo"'", if the general demurrer \\Tere overruled. And this 
\Yas all that need be, or that actually was, then deeided. 
This de1nurrer, of course, adinitted the facts pleaded. 
One thing that then appeared somewhat important 
in the Court's opinion was the discussion there based 
upon respondents' contention that they had sufficiently 
pleaded that the '~public authorities" had made "re-
quirements'' (p. 130-131), and that such imposed some 
obligation upon us. Thus, in referring to "obligations" 
in the opinion, and as this term is used in p~ar. 8 of the 
lease as to the roof, this semed to have influenced the 
Court's discussion. At least, if it had then been under-
stood that there had been no actual requirements by 
public officials, the opinion would have been shorter and, 
perhaps, different. 
It can now be emphasized that this record is con-
clusive that public authorities here made no relevent 
requirements at any time, either as to what should be, or 
as to what was done. And so, as stated supra, the Trial 
Court instructed that no obligation arose as to any such, 
at all. And, conversely, no right, as to such, in respon-
dents, arose. That whole matter, in fact, never was 
rightly in this case. 
Incidentally, we believe, if the Court cares to exam-
ine the authorities cited by it (p. 130, par. 1), under what 
is stated to be a ''general rule'' as to requirements 
affecting landlords, it will he found that these apply only 
to ~uch alterations and improve1nents as are in the na-
ture of additions, things such as sprinkling systems for 
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fire protection, or fire escapes, or some such things to 
Ineet safety or sanitary requirements, and, perhaps, as 
in one, later case, the removal of show window projec-
tions over sidewalks, by new ordinance require1nents. 
And, we might also add, there is certainly no covenant 
of appellants here to make "alterations or improve-
ments.'' 
Another matter extensively considered in the opinion 
was put out of the case by this Court's decision, rejecting 
our contention that the duty to make the changes, as 
made, was imposed upon respondents by the second clause 
of 'par. 8 of the lease. This followed the acceptance 
clause, above quoted, and was generally to the effect 
that "for the last 10 years of the lease" all improve-
ments, etc., regardless of how necessitated, were to be 
made at the expense of the lessees. This Court held 
that the pleading indicated that the alleged changes and 
necessity for repairs arose before this 10-year period 
started, so that this covenant did not apply (p. 131, par. 
3). 
This duty, as then contended by us, however, got in 
the Court's decision at different points. After stating, for 
example, that the covenant to ''keep the roof in good con-
dition ... implies that, at the time of the lease, it w~as 
in good condition,'' the opinion says : 
''The obligation to keep the roof in good con-
dition and repair for the entire term of the lease 
eliminates the thought that the L.essees would have 
to put the roof in good condition before that obli-
gation fell upon the shoulders of the L.essors." 
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This ~tate1nent is, at first, soinewhat eonfusing. It is 
the state1nent \vhich, no doubt, greatly influenced the 
Trial Court. It i~ quite clear, ho,vever, that the words 
"that obligation'' did not refer to the ·p,receding words 
''put the roof~'' etc. This seen1s so, both because of the 
context, as w--ell as because of the thought being ex-
pressed; •' that obligation,'' quite clearly refers to the 
lessors' covenant "to keep", as recited in the preceding 
sentence, and as quoted in part above, to ''keep· the roof'' 
in repair. There \Yas no covenant by anybody to ''put'' 
anything in any condition. It was construed, however, 
as a holding that we were to put the roof in a different 
condition. 
This is not a statement, we think, and there is no 
stateinent, either as dicta, or at all, that ap·pellants were 
obligated to put this building in a different condition than 
that in which it was accepted. 
For complete clarification before leaving this 10-
year provision as to lessees' duty to repair, we call atten-
tion that our contention on appeal, as to the duty of 
respondents under this p·rovision, was wholly unneees-
sary in this case anyway. This is not a suit to compel 
respondents to do ·anything, either under this covenant, 
or at all. It is a suit to establish merely the alleged right 
of respondents to have certain changes in the le·ased 
structure made at the expense of appellants, under their 
eovenant discussed next under point II. 
Now we come to something that was and is· in the 
ea~e, and which was, in fact, considered as ground for 
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overruling our demurrer, and which this court indicated 
was a ground requiring reversal. This relates to respon-
dents' allegations of substantial changes in the condition 
of the roof occurring after the lease was signed. These 
allegations are in the amendment to their complaint (36), 
and are recited at considerable length, with italics for 
emphasis, in the opinion of this C·ourt (p. 130-131) and as 
quoted above. After which recital this Court said: 
''The pleading obviously refer to conditions 
after the execution of the lease.'' · 
The word ''after'' was also italicized for emphasis. 
Going back a little, the Trial Court had sustained our 
demurrer before this amendment was added to the com-
plaint. This, then, left us, upon renewing our demurrer, 
with the contention that, since the pleading did not dis-
close that these alleged changes did not result from 
structural defects which had existed at the time of the 
execution of the lease, they could not have the benefit of 
these alleged ·changes coming afterward. We had some 
authority on this, and the Trial Court went along with 
us on it. But, this Court did not. So, we bow out on this 
graciously, because we have to. 
And, this Court also unquestiona~bly indicated its 
opinion that respondents were entitled to rely upon 
and to establish in the Court below these allegations 
as to changes, and that, therefore, the demurrer should 
not have been sustained below. 
It would seem idle to contend that this Court, so 
fully and with such emphasis, went into these allega-
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tion~ of changed conditions, vvithout intending to rely 
thereon for its decision. If the Court had intended to 
decide~ and had decided, that the lease itself gave the 
right to respondents to have the alterations and imp,rove-
Inents, \vhich \\~ere then con1pleted, paid for by us, reg,ar:d-
l-ess of these changes, it \Yould have said so, and elin1i-
nated all this discussion. The case was quite clearly 
reversed on the ground of the alleged changes, after the 
lease \Vas made. 
It, obviously, was not reversed wholly on the assump-
tion that the alleged rights and duties existed because 
of '·requirements of building authorities,'' even though 
the respondent's arguments on the appeal had convinced 
the Court that their pleadings alleged such. If the Court 
had so intended to rule, that would have ended it. There 
would have been no need for discussion of the allega-
tions of changes in the roof structure; nor was it re-
versed because of the ruling on existing structural de-
fects, as above referred to, or on account of overruling 
us on the 10-year provision. These could ·have had, and 
clearly were given, no such effect. 
Now, on the trial, none of these last three matters 
entered into the instructions on liability, or into the 
judgment here ap~pealed from, at all. Indeed, it seemed 
to us important then, and also now, that, at this point of 
decision in the Court below, everything in the opinion of 
this C~ourt was out of this case, except only the lease 
covenant~ recited there, and the discussion and conclu-
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sion on these allegations of changed conditions. And 
these were also not then considered or submitted. 
As to right and liability, the Court had then to 
determine only (1) whether this Court had intended to 
hold that respondents ·had the right to charge us, as a 
matter of law, on the lease covenants alone; or (2) 
whether that Court should have ruled on the proof, or 
lack of it, as to these alle_gation.s of changes, or, at least, 
to submit the issue of fact on these by instructions, if 
there was thought to be any conflict. 
In effect, the Court concluded that this Court did 
intend to hold, as suggested in the first of these alterna-
tives. It refused to consider the second suggested alter-
native, at all. 
In order to conclude that this Court so intended, it 
must also be concluded that it wasted an awful lot of 
its time and space, and also the time of the litigants. 
Instead of saying simply that the Court was ''of the 
opinion that the demurrer should have been overruled,'' 
and remanding the case for further proceeding generally 
as was done, it would have indicated that the question of 
liability was settled by the covenant of the lease alone, 
and that there wa.s left for determination only the ques-
tion of damages. 
So, it seems to us, that this Court must be deemed 
to have decided in this case, that to charge appellants' 
allegations of change in the conditions accepted were re-
quired to be made and established. 
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\recall attention no\v, on the point of the acceptance 
of rental property in the condition accepted, to other 
decisions of this Court, as well as so1ne of those in other 
Courts. 
W-ilson v. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pa:c. 638, 43 
A.L.R. 1269: Justice Cherry states: 
''The general proposition is well settled that 
in the absence of warranty, deceit or fraud on the 
·part of the landlord, the lessee takes the risk of 
the lluality of the pre1nises and cannot make the 
landlord answerable for any injury sustained by 
him during his occupancy by reason of the defec-
tive condition of the premises or their faulty con-
struction. Doyle v. U.P. Railway Co. 147 U.S. 
-!13; Reams v. Taylor, 31 Ut. 288; 87 Pac. 1089; 
Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405, 92 N.E. 496.'' 
The statement above quoted was ap~p~roved in the 
case of Hatzis v. U.S. Fuel Comp~an.y, Supreme Court of 
Utah, May 11, 1933; 21 Pac. (2) 862 at 864. 
Middlekauf v. Smith, 1 Maryland 329: 
The Landlord leased a mill for a two-year term 
and covenanted to keep the mill and mill race in good 
repair. Lessee sued for damages for his failure to rep~air 
and recovered in the lower Court. 
On appeal the upper Court held that evidence that 
the ·premises were not kept in good repair should have 
been refused because nothing was shown as to the time 
when it went out of repair. 
"Under the covenant to repair generally, the 
coventantor will be bound to keep the building 
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in as good a state, as it was when the agreeinent 
was made, to :rpake good all deteriorations arising 
from natural decay, and all injuries resulting 
from inevitable accident, but he is not bound to do 
more. And where an old house is rented, with the 
usual covenants to keep the sa1ne in repair, the 
coventantor will not he bound to put it in an 
improved state, nor to avert the consequences of 
the elements, but only to keep it in a state in 
which it was at the time of demise, by the timely 
expenditure of money and care. Guttridge v. 
Munyard 7 C. & P. 12·9, Archbold's Law of Land-
lord and Tenant 176.'' 
LeVine v. Mc~Clenath(}Jfl,, 246 Pac. 347, 92 A.. 317. 
L. R. A. 1917 B, 235: 
This case holds that a property owner is not, in the 
absence of a covenant or warranty, liable for injury to 
its tenants' goods by a leak in the roof due to faulty 
construction in the building. In this case it was alleged 
that the building was defectively and impToperly and 
imperfectly constructed and that in consequence of the 
defective, improper and negligent conditions aforesaid 
of the roof of said building and the party wall and the 
cornices around the skylight, the roof leaked causing 
damage to the merchandise. Court holds : 
"We know of no case in Pennsylvania and 
none has been called to our attention in which a 
tenant was permitted to recover damages against 
the landlord upon the ground that the demised 
premises had been defectively and improperly 
constructed. If a tenant could recover damag~~ 
upon the grounds that the de1nised pre1nises had 
not been prop~er ly constructed, all that has been 
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~aid in our ea~e about t ht\ rult\ about eu veat en1p-
tor 'v?uld be n1eaningless.'' 
.A .. California statute requires the lessor of buildings 
to be used for hlmlan habitation to "repair all subse-
quent dilapidations \vhich rendered it untenantable" 
and a further statute provides that if after notice by the 
lessee to the lessor, the lessor neglected to repair, lessee 
may repair the same and deduct the same from the 
rental. 
In the case of Wall estate v. Standard Box Comp1wny, 
128 Pac. 1020, the Court held that these statutes did not 
authorize the tenant to. p,ut in new work or new con-
veniences which did not exist theretofore. 
''Much, if not the greater part of the work, 
for which the defendant claims credit in the case 
at bar was new in character and was not for the 
repairs of dilapidations. No effort was made at 
the trial by the defendant to show how much of 
the expense incurred by it in complying with the 
order of the board of health was for new work 
and new conveniences, nor how much was for re-
pair of dilapidations. * * *We think it quite clear 
that sections do not require the landlord after 
the beginning of the tenancy to install new con-
veniences, but only require him to repair 'subse-
quent diZapiaations' of the building which ren-
dered it untenantable.'' 
Sheets v. Selden, 19 L. Ed. 166 (7 Wall416): 
''The tendency of modern decisions is not 
to imply covenants which might and ought to 
have been expressed, if intended. A covenant is 
never implied that the lessor will 1nake any re-
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pairs. The tenant cannot make repairs at the 
exp·ense of the landlord, unless by special agree-
ment.'' 
Commonwealth v. S~amson (Penn.) 196 A 564: 
Lease provided that in consideration of low rental, 
lessee was to take the premises ''as is,'' and at his own 
cost to put and keep· the interior in good order and repair 
as well as make improvements. The building collapsed, 
fire broke out and injuries resulted. In sustaining a con-
viction of the lessee of manslaughter the eourt held: 
''We think the terms of the lease clearly dis-
close that, in consideration of the low rental and 
obtaining possession of the building before the 
time he was to pay rent, lessee was not only to 
make interior repairs, but he was to take the 
building 'as is,' and also make such improvements 
as were required so that it would he safe in gen-
eral for the purpose for which it was rented. 
This he did not do.'' 
Roche v. Sawyer (Mass.) 57 N.E. 216: 
''The walk was in good repair, and in the 
same -condition in which it was when Grady hired 
his tenement. If it was dangerous at all to a per-
son in the exercise of due care, the danger arose 
out of its original construction, and not fron1 lack 
of repair. * * * Everything was plainly visible, 
and in the same condition as when hired. Grady 
got and had the benefit of the tenement he hired, 
including its approaches, and had no right to 
insist on anything better. His rent must be a~­
sumed to have been gauged in accordance with 
the thing he hired, and its condition at the ti1ne." 
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Ga.de r. _;_\"at£onal Crea:n~ery) 32-± ~lass. 515, 87 N.E. 
(2) 180: 
~·In the ordinary lease of real estate there is 
no in1plied w·arranty that the premises are .fit 
for occupancy or for the p·articular use eontenl-
plated by the lessee. The lessee takes the prein-
i:ses as he finds them." 
The foregoing cases are more directly on the right 
of the tenant here, the authorities cited next under Point 
II on the duty of the landlord, also support Point I. 
POINT II. 
A COVENANT TO "KEEP" IN REPAIR DOES NOT 
MEAN TO "PUT" IN REP AIR. 
This point is ·on the covenant, In paragraph 8 of 
the lease, as follows: 
~' ( 8) F~or the entire term of this lease the 
Lessors shall have the obligation to keep the roof 
of the leased premises in good condition and re-
pair; to pay general taxes and lighting assess-
ments levied against said property, all fire insur-
ance premiums and prerniums ·on any other insur-
ance the owner elects to carry.'' 
The point is that this covenant does not impose the 
obligation to "put" or "place" the roof drain, or the 
other structure involved, in a different condition by 
"1naking" a new construction. The existing condition 
of these had been specifically accepted. It had not 
changed. 
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We have discussed the matter under Point I, from 
the standpoint of the right of respondents, and now, 
under II, will diseuss it from the standpoint of the duty 
of ap~pellants. These, of course, are closely related. 
It seems clear that the words "entire term'' add 
nothing to the fact that this covenant was intended to be 
in effect only during the term of the lease, and that it 
imposed no duty to change anything before the term 
started. And, as we shall attempt to show, the word 
"good" adds nothing to the obligation, and that "con-
dition'' or ''repair'' means the same thing. So that, 
stated plainly, appellants agreed that, from the date of 
this lease and during its existence, they would keep the 
roof in repair. 
In this connection, we are aware that, on first appeal, 
in discussing our other contentions there, including the 
one that respondent had accepted any ·changes that might 
thereafter result from structural defects existing before 
the lease, the writer of this Court's opinion (p. 131, par. 
4) makes a statement which may he construed as inti-
mating a somewhat different view of these terms. It 
is to the effect that the term ''good'' may add something. 
This was, as pointed out, on this now abandoned 
contention of ours. The statement was not a holding of 
. the court. It was unnecessary, either to the discussion 
or to the conclusion reached in the opinion, and is clearly 
dicta. It should not be considered as binding the court 
n·ow, on this point II, especially if it is established that 
this statement of the writer of the opinion is contrary 
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to the la\Y. The authorities are clear also that to keep 
a .. good condition," as applied to an old building, re-
lates only to its condition as it is then accepted, and in 
\vhich it is \Yhen the covenant is entered into. 
The question directly is, does a covenant to ''keep'' 
such conditions iinpiQse a duty to inunediately construct 
a different or additional drain system, or to construct 
a different roof supporting structure T 
The terms adopted by Jhe lower court, in instructing 
the jury, supra, under point I, as well as by the respon-
dents, · in their demands, required that we ''put,'' 
''place,'' or ''make'' the structure involved in good 
condition and repair, and ''remedy any defects'' therein, 
and ''make' ' the structure ''adequate. '' 
We had made no covenant containing any of these 
terms, or any terms of like meaning or import. 
Farr v. Wasatch Chemi,cal Co., 143 P. (2) 281. In 
this case, this Court not only held that a written coven-
ant to keeep the floor and elevator in good repair could 
not be construed to require the landlady to '' p~lace'' them 
in such condition, but held that allegations that she so 
covenanted to ' 'place' ' them in such condition was ''in 
direct conflict'' with the lease covenant to ''keep'' them 
so. 
On this point, the Court said: 
"The provision of the written lease with 
which it is urged that this evidence was in conflict, 
provide~ : 'Lessor shall keeip the floor and roof 
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in good repa.ir, except as to damages caused b~· 
Lessee, at her expense so as to keep said prern-
ises tenantable; * * *' 
''Certainly the allegation that the plaintiff 
agreed to 'ma.int.ain' the elevator in serviceable 
condition in addition to repa.iring the floor and 
roof is in direct conflict with the written lease 
* * * Evidence given in an attempt to show that 
·plaintiff had orally agreed to repair and maintain 
the elevator was designed to vary the terms of a 
written instrument and was therefore incorn-
petent.'' 
There was claimed, however, in that case that a 
prior oral agreement to put or place these things in 
repair was made, independently of the written lease, 
and was intended to have been complied with before 
the written lease went into effect. 
The Court held that the party alleging this, had a 
right to suptport tbis independent arrangement, and in 
connection with this oral agreement said: 
"The allegation that plaintiff agreed [oral-
ly l to 'place' the warehouse in a serviceable con-
dition for the intended uses stands on a s·ome-
what different light.'' 
This Court clearly and necessarily held that the 
tenant there had to rely upon the oral agreement, and 
would have been out of court on the written agreement, 
thus emphasizing the exact distinction in meaning be-
tween the terms "place" and "keep" for which we 
contend. These terms are in ''direct conflict.'' 
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lrest v. Hart, 30 Kentucky 258. The covenant was 
\~to keep the farn1 and building-s in g~ood repair.'' 
"''rhe "·ord keep, seen1s to us, to have direct 
reference to the condition of the premises at the 
tin1e of the lease, and that the then state of repair 
n1ust be taken to be, "'"hat the parties meant by 
good repairs. There is a so broad and palapable a 
distinction between a pron1ise to ptt.t into repair 
and one to keep in repair, that it is impossible 
to believe the parties Ineant the former, when 
they used the latter expression. A covenant to 
keep in repair is certainly no broader than a 
covenant to repair, and if the latter obliges only 
to make good the dan1age ad interin1, no greater 
stress can be laid on the promise to keep· in re-
pair.'' 
The last sentence of this statement seems certainly 
sound. And, in any event, in the case at bar no covenant, 
either to repair or to keep in repair, could be construed 
as being intended to go to conditions back of the begin-
ning of ,the lease, ,because here we have the specific 
covenant of acceptance o~ both the "condition" and 
''state of repair'' that the building was then in. 
St. Joseph & St. Louis R(J)ilroad Co. v. St. Lou.is Iron 
Mountain & Southern Rai.lwray Co., (Mo. 1896), 36 S.W. 
602. The covenant: ''The party of the second part shall 
and will at all times during the hereby demised term 
keep the building upon the land hereby demised insured 
* * * and will keep the demised railroad equipment and 
property in good order and repair,'' was interpreted 
by the court as follows : 
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''A covenant to keep leased premises in re-
pair imposed upon the tenant the obligation 'to 
keep' the premises in as good repair as when the 
agreement is made. Covenants 'to keep in repair' 
and to 'keep in good repair as they now are' are 
held to amount to the same thing in law." 
Foss v. St·a.nton, (Va.), 57 A. 942. 
''The covenant was to keep the premises in 
good rep~air, not to put and leave them in good 
repair. The lessee's duty to the lessor under this 
covenant is to be measured by the condition of 
the property when taken.'' 
Stultz v. Locke, 47 Maryland 562. The Lessor had 
covenanted to kee·p the mills and machinery, wa.ter power 
and fencing on the premises ''in as good repair as they 
are now.'' In the narrative of the complaint, the tenant· 
alleged that the Lessor ''agreed to keep in repair.'' The 
court held: 
''It follows that the covenant as stated in 
the narrative, is in its legal effect the same as 
that contained in the articles of agreement. Or 
in other words, that a covenant to keep in repair, 
and a covenant to keep in ·as good repair as they 
now are, are identically the same covenant.'' 
24 Cyc. 1088: 
''A covenant to keep the premises in repair 
is generally construed to mean and impose on the 
covenantor the legal obligation to keep the preln-
ises in as good repair as when the agreement was 
made; but does not require him to make repair~ 
necessitating radical changes in the structure, of 
a permanent, substantial and unusual tharacter." 
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T7 incent r. (7nrne, (Mich.), 97 N.W. 34. Under a 
covenant to keep in good repair, the case went to jury 
on instruction that repairs required were those ordinary 
prudent farmers 1nake. 
d * * * the test 1nade Ly the contract is not 
that they shall be kept in such reasonable repair 
as ordinarily prudent farnters use, but that they 
shall be kept in such repair and condition as when 
taken.'' 
In Cad/tnan v. Hy-Grade Foods Products Coriplora.-
tion C~Iass.), 33 N.E. (2d) 759, the action was for failure 
to keep and return the premises ''in good tenant~hle 
condition'' as stipulated. Actually they were not in good 
condition \vhen returned because they required a new 
floor understructure. Plaintiff demanded return on a 
strict technical interpretation of this covenant. Says the 
Court: 
"All the plaintiff's exceptions are based upon 
their contention that the defendant was obligated 
to surrender the premises at the end of the term 
in good tenantable repair, regardless of their 
actual c.ondition at the time the term began.'' 
While in that case it was admitted in the lease that 
the premises were then in "good condition," it is the 
same here because of appellants' acceptance of the con-
dition as of February 19, 1945. The court then remarks: 
' 'There was evidence from which it could 
have been found that the conditions above de-
scribed were substantian~~ the sa1ne at the begin-
ning as at the end of the term. 
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''The phrases 'in good tenant,able repair' 
and 'in good condition' appearing in such lease 
do not have a fixed or technical meaning which 
is always the same regardless of the character 
or use of the building to which they refer.'' 
Later on the court remarks in referring to the good 
condition at the commencement of the lease: 
''The standard there set is the actual state of 
repair, whether good or bad, in which the premises 
were at the time of the letting, not a degree of 
re:pair measured by the abstract standard of 
goo·dness. 
• • • 
''It is proper in the construction of the lan-
guage of a lease to read together different pro-
visions therein dealing with the same subject. 
matter, and where possible all the language used 
should be given a reasonable meaning. 
* * * 
"When, however, this covenant is read with 
the earlier admission in the lease that the prenl-
ises were 'in good condition' at the time of its 
execution, uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
phra.se 'in good tenantable repair' disappears and 
all the language of the lea.se respecting the con-
dition of the premises as to repair may be given 
significance. Thus read, the intention of the 
parties is adequately manifested that the actual 
condition of the building in respect to good tenant-
able repair existing when the term began should 
be the ·condition as to good tenantable repair in 
which the building was required to be when de-
livered up to the plaintiffs at the end of the term, 
exce~pt as to the effeect of reasonable wearing and 
use.'' 
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~\pplying this ~ound reasoning to the case a.t bar, 
here is an a.gree1uent by the Lessees accepting the prem-
ises (including the roof), in the condition they were in 
on FebruarY 19~ 1~)±5. Lessors' covenant is referable to 
ol ' 
that condition, and they \vere obligated only to keep the 
roof in such condition. They are not require·d to pay the 
cost of destroying the then existing roof and its support-
ing understructure and constructing a new understruc-
ture of different_materials. 
The reasoning of the foregoing case seems very 
in1portant. These covenants to keep in repair or in good 
condition, or to keep and return in such condition, appear 
frequently. They appear more often as covenants by 
lessees, than by lessors. There must be hundreds of 
leases made daily, in which it is routine to state that the 
tenant will keep the premises in good condition and 
repair, or equivalent words. Must the tenant, then, 
place the landlord's premises in good condition and 
repair, if they are not in such condition at the com-
mencement of the lease~ 
The rule, as this case points out, cannot be that they 
are, by these terms, required to place the building in a 
better condition than when they entered into the eontract 
relationship concerning it. And, if it was, had then, a 
defective building, or a partially dilapidated one, im-
prove it into a good 'One, or one which would be ''in 
good condition and repair." 
This, obviously, would work great hardship. And 
the law gives to these terms the san1e meaning, no 
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matter which party is bound by the covenant containing 
them. There can be no possible difference in meaning 
on this account. 
Lister v. Lane, 2 Q.B. 214, 9 Eng. Rule Case 478: 
''These cases (old English cases) establish 
that, where there is a general covenant to repair, 
the age and general condition of the house at the 
commencement of the tenancy are to be taken 
into consideration in considering whether the 
covenant has been broken; and that a tenant who 
enters upon an old house is not bound to leave 
it in the same state as if it were a new one. 
"You have then, to look at the condition of 
the house at the ti1ne of the demise, and amongst 
other things, the nature of the house-what kind 
of house it it. If it is a timber house, the lessee 
is not bound to repair it by making a brick or 
stone house If it is a house built upon wooden 
piles in soft ground the lessee is not bound to 
take them out and to !prut in concrete pile. 
''However large the words of the covenant 
may be, a covenant to rep·air a house is not a 
covenant to give a different thing from that which 
the tenant took when he entered into the cove-
nant. He has to repair that thing which he took; 
he is not obliged to make a new and different 
thing; and, moreover, the result of the nature 
and condition of the house itself, the result of 
time upon that state of things, is not a breach of 
the covenant to repair. '' 
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EFFECT OF DECISION O·N POINTS 
I. AND II. 
If we are correct in our contention as to point I, 
or point II, or as to both of these, it would follow that 
\Ye are entitled to a reversal here. And, also, that it is 
not necessary to consider the remaining point. 
The previous decision of this court was intended 
to, and did, insure that the parties hereto would have 
their day in Court. They have had this. And respon-
dents have exhaustively presented their claims and 
contentions. 
It would seem, therefore, that if we have sustained 
either, or both, of these fundamental and determinative 
points the Court, up'On reversal, should direct a judg-
ment of dismissal. There would he nothing left on re-
spondents' contentions, as made below, to try. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO SU·PPORT THE R.OOF 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. 
This numbered assignment and point is based upon 
the error of the Court in refusing to give our requested 
instructions No. 13 and No. 18 ( 130, 135), and in sub-
mitting the case on instructions and a form of verdict 
which failed to present, but which excluded, our theory 
as to damages. 
The evidence was conclusive that th~ roof itself 
never ''got out of re·pair,'' after it was accepted, and 
after we had agreed to keep it in repair. That the under-
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structure was tested when it was put on, and that it was 
tested by the manager of a roofing company, after the 
date of acceptance, and before the date of occupancy. 
Some slight flashing repairs were made, and it was thus 
placed in good repair, as a roof. ·This is not in dispute. 
There is no claim that it leaked or failed thereafter; or 
that it did not continue to function, until taken out. 
The contention was, that the supporting structure was 
inadequate, or may be inadequate, to support it, in view 
of future heavy snows; and, also, that the drain was not 
satisfactory. 
We had offered the testimony, as shown in the state-
ments, supra, of a firm 'Of experts, Young and Hansen, 
and another expert, Miles Miller, that it could have been 
safely supported without the necessity of re~placing it 
by another kind of structure entirely. No witness denied 
this. There was other corroboration ( 357), and, in fact, 
their architect at first so indicated (Ex. 7). 
It was shown, without dispute, in the evidence that 
respondents' objections to the drain could have been 
met, if the changes demanded back in 1945 had been 
assumed 1and 'paid for bjy appellants, amounting to 
$485.56 (Ex. 18). There was no objection by appellants 
to these changes being made by respondents. There was 
a disagreement as to who should pay for these. 
It is also shown that the skylights could have been 
taken out and trussed through, as first suggested by 
respondents' architect (Ex. 7), for $800.00. (See Young 
and Hansen's letter, Ex. ''P''). 
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.:\lso, that any loose joint~, or connections, in the 
structure could have been securely fastened by nailing 
or bolting, for not to exceed $500.00 ( 779). That these 
would have given sufficient support. 
It is true that respondents, \Yitnesses testified that 
this \vas not the best \Yay to do it (3'57, 332), nor the 
way which 'vould Inake the best store ( 307-8), and that, 
in the long run, the bow-strin_g steel truss construction 
would not cost n1ore. There was also some testimony 
as to individual pieces of imperfect struts, or nails, 'OT 
single timbers. The jury, of course, under the testimony, 
could have allowed something for substitutions or repairs 
of these, if they had considered such necessary. The 
evidence shows these could have been done. This roof 
structure, as it was, had supported the roof for over 
twenty years. 
There is a vast difference between these figures and 
the verdict, covering a complete demolition and different 
construction. This was our theory, and the jury should 
have been instructed S'O as to present it and so as to 
authorize the jury to determine whether the same roof 
could have been supported in the manner and at the com-
paratively smaller cost, as we contended. 
When the form of verdict (165) was ready for sub-
Inission, \ve rnade objection on this ground, and called 
attention directly to this matter (996). It was not 
ehanged to meet this, nor was this theory submitted for 
consideration h:' the jury, as requested, 01' at all. rrhe 
result \Vas that, under the instructions previously refer-
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red to, the jury obviously proceeded to consider only, 
and to charge us with the cost of the new construction. 
Several instructions definitely negatived our theory 
(see 140, 145, 146, 14 7, 153, 154). The verdict, in view 
of instructions like No. 13 ( 153) and instruction No. 
10 (150), could have left no doubt that damages "with 
respect to puJtirng the roof in good condi tron and re-
pair,'' meant ·putting in the whole new structure. 
Plaintiffs' list of claims had been repeatedly called 
to the jurors' attention, and, at least twice,. introduced 
as exhibits, one of which was withdrawn. The court had 
s-et up this list (Ex. "D-1") in instruction No. 1 (139) 
in detail, and repeated it in part in instruction No. 14 
(154). Under all these, the jury would understand that 
the only question was this amount of damage, and it 
was already set up for them. 
Another thing that had made the presentation of our 
theory important, and that also points up that this fail-
ure was ·prejudicial, was the carrying, throughout the 
trial, of the theme that we were disoheying public offi-
cials and violating the City's ordinances. While this, 
as a claim of liability, went out at the end of the trial, 
the damage was done. Our many alleged acts of com-
mission and omission in this respect runs throughout 
the record. First, that these things imposed conclusive 
liability upon us ( 619), and that we were bound con-
clusively by what the City authorities said (779), and 
so on. 
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~o that \Yt\ \Yere left \vhere it could be argued that 
"·e "~ere deliberately endangering the public, and even 
the jurors and their families. They, quite naturally, 
gave us the works. ''T e 1nade a request for an instruc-
tion that "~otud have helped on this, and it was refused 
(134). 
''T e had 1nade a n1otion to strike these things from 
the con1plaint, before the appeal. However, in view of 
the fact that our general den1urrer had been sustained, 
we did not c.ross-appeal on the trial court's denial of our 
motion to strike these, and, as we view the matter, as 
long as they were in, we could not keep out evidence 
relating to them. We were only successful in eliminating 
them at the very end ·of the trial, although we raised 
the matter several times. 
Gihisalbert's, et al. v. Lagarde (La.), 147 So. 763. 
Tenants, as part of consideration for the lease, agreed 
to pay for '·any alterations, changes, repairs, or recon-
struction of every nature and kind, whether ordinary 
or extraordinary * * * necessary to keep the pro~1erty 
in good order and repair." Upon lessee's failure t~ 
repair, lessor made extensive repairs. The court limited 
the recovery on the following grounds: 
"Upon taking up a study of plaintiff's claim, 
we are at once impressed by the apparent effort 
to charge defendant for everything that was done 
by plaintiffs to recondition and rehabilitate the 
building, and that little regard \Vas had for the 
necessity of deter1nining whether the particular 
work done was Inade necessary by dan1age sus-
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tained during the ter1n of the lease. It was appar-
ently plaintiffs' intention, since the building was 
quite an old one and not equipped in a modern 
way, to ~place upon defendant all possible expense 
of renewing the building as far as possible.''· 
Our right, in this kind of case, to have our theory 
submitted to the -court, we think, will not be questioned. 
It is supported by this -court, and by the courts generally. 
We cite the following authority: 
State Bank of B·earver c·ounty v. Hollingshead 
(Utah), 25 P. (2) 612.: 
''It is proper and gene:rally necessary for 
the -court in its instructions to submit to the jury 
the theory of the case as presented by the defen-
dant as well as that presented by the plaintiff." 
Webb v. Snow (Utah), 13-2 P. (2) 114: 
''The jurors should have been instructed on 
the· defendants' theory of the case as well as on 
the plaintiff's theory." 
See, also, M artitn v. !Bkeff ield (Utah), 189 P. ( 2) 124; 
Pratt v. Ut~ah Light alf~td Tr:action Co. (Utah), 169 P. 
868, 86'9 ; R·aney v. Barlow·, 112 U. S. 207, 28 L. Ed. 662, 
5 S. Ct. 104; 53 Am. J u,lr., P'· 487, Sec. 626, and p. 500, 
Sec. 649. 
CO·NCLUSION 
At the end of argument on Points I and II, we 
pointed out the effect of decision on these points. This 
need not be repeated here. These set up the conclusive 
matter of law involved. 
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''T e have, also, presented Point Lll, as one of the 
additional errors clailued at the trial, and which was 
prejudicial. 
It follo\vs, ,,.e believe, fron1 the failure of evidenee 
of any change of conditions, that the evidence does not 
support the verdict and judgment. The same are against 
la,,·~ and, under the~e, and the other points relied upon 
and presented, appellants are entitled to a reversal of 
the judgment entered herein. 
Also, in vie'v of the fact that respondents have had 
full opportunity to present their case, ap.pellants are 
entitled to an order of final dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
AL \TIN I. SMITH and 
MULLINER, PRINCE AND MULLINER 
Attorneys for Appeltants 
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